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Policymakers have responded to 
the need to facilitate farm succession 
by providing targeted programs, 
particularly for beginning farmers; 
however, information is needed on the 
obstacles and attractions perceived 
by the older generation of producers 
who are nearing retirement to target 
succession programs more effectively. 
A mail survey was designed to 
obtain information from Iowa cow-
calf producers and feedlot operators. 
The comprehensive survey included 
questions regarding various aspects 
of cattle production, including 
demographics and current production 
and marketing practices as well as 
questions regarding succession planning 
and what existing producers saw as the 
greatest obstacles and attractions for the 
state’s cattle sector. Interested readers 
may ϐind the full set of survey questions 
and responses in Schulz (2014a,b). 

GIVEN THE current demographics of beef cattle producers in the 
United States, a signiϐicant turnover of 
productive assets will likely occur in 
the industry over the next decade. The 
2012 Census of Agriculture reported 
that 35 percent of US beef cattle and 
ranching and 28 percent of US cattle 
feedlot principal operators are over 
the age of 64 (USDA NASS 2014). An 
additional 27 percent of beef cattle 
and ranching principal operators and 
28 percent of cattle feedlot principal 
operators are between 55 and 64 
years of age (USDA NASS 2014). Yet, 
according to the 2015 Iowa Farm and 
Rural Life Poll, among farmers who 
plan to retire in the next ϐive years, 
only 55 percent have identiϐied a 
potential successor (Arbuckle and 
Baker 2015). 
Ensuring the transfer of 
economically viable farms to the 
next generation has implications 
for the future size and structure of 
the industry as well as for the rural 
economies that depend on agriculture. 
Succession Planning, Perceived Obstacles, and Attractions for 
Future Generations Entering Beef Cattle Production
By Lee Schulz, Georgeanne Artz, and Patrick Gunn
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Larger, more proϐitable farms are more 
likely to have a successor in place 
(Kimhi and Nachlieli 2001), while 
operators of smaller farms lacking 
a successor are more likely to begin 
a process of disinvestment in their 
property once they near retirement 
in their late-50s (Mishra, Wilson, and 
Williams 2009). Over time, this pattern 
results in fewer, larger, and more 
capital-intensive operations, creating 
a barrier to entry for beginning 
producers who do not inherit an 
existing farm. 
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For the questions used in this analysis, 
215 cow-calf producer and 185 feedlot 
operator usable surveys were available. 
Similar to the average age of US 
cattle producers, producers responding 
to the survey were on average in 
their late-50s. Roughly 90 percent of 
producers have more than 20 years of 
experience in raising beef cattle. Not 
surprisingly, given the average age 
of producers, 49 percent of cow-calf 
operators and 52 percent of feedlot 
operators expect to exit beef cattle 
production within the next 10 years. 
Across both cow-calf producers 
and feedlot operators approximately 50 
percent expect to be raising cattle for 10 
more years or less (Table 1). However, 
a signiϐicant number of producers with 
relatively short time horizons do not have 
a succession plan. Thirty-eight percent 
of the cow-calf producers and 39 percent 
of the feedlot operators who expect to be 
raising cattle for 10 years or less do not 
have a succession plan in place. 
Twenty-nine percent of cow-calf 
producers and 44 percent of feedlot 
producers have encouraged an heir to 
take over the cattle operation but are 
willing to work with a non-family member 
if an heir is not present or interested in 
entering cattle production (Table 2). On 
the other hand, 33 percent of cow-calf 
producers and 28 percent of feedlot 
operators have encouraged an heir but 
are not willing to work with a non-family 
member. Twenty-seven percent of cow-
calf producers and 18 percent of feedlot 
operators have not encouraged an heir 
and are not willing to work with a non-
family member. Only about 10 percent of 
both cow-calf and feedlot owners have 
not encouraged an heir but are willing to 
work with a non-family member. 
Among producers that do not have 
a succession plan, feedlot operators 
consider work hours as well as labor 
availability and costs to be more of an 
continued on page 12
Table 1. Succession Planning by Expected Years to be Raising Cattle1 
toldeeF flac-woC 
Expect to raise 
cattle: 10 years >10 years 10 years >10 years 
 49% 51% 52% 48%
 (n = 104) (n = 110) (n = 96) (n = 89)
Type of 
Succession 
Plan: 
N % N % N % N % 
Transfer to next 
generation or 
secondary 
operator
 
42 40 36 33 55 57 42 47 
Transfer to 
outside 
established or 
beginning 
producer 
7 7 0 0 0 0 2 2 
Sell cattle and 
use land for 
other 
purposes 
16 15 3 3 4 4 4 4 
No Plan 39 38  70 64 37 39 41 47
Total 104 100 110 100 96 100 89 100
Note: One cow-calf respondent was not included in this analysis because they  
responded “Other” without further explanation to the question, “Is there a  
succession plan for transferring your cattle operation upon exiting the industry?” 
1Frequencies calculated using weights that adjust sample characteristics to  
match NASS cow-calf and feedlot operation numbers. Frequencies rounded to  
the nearest whole number. 
 
Table 2. Producers’ Encouragement of an Heir and Willingness to Work  
with a Non-Family Member to take over Ownership of the Cattle Operation1 
  If you have an heir (e.g., son, daughter, 
grandchild, in-law, other relative) to take 
over the cattle operation, are you 
encouraging them to do so? 
  Yes No
Would you be willing 
to work with a non-
family member if an 
heir is not present or 
interested in entering 
cattle production? 
Yes 
Cow-calf Feedlot Cow-calf Feedlot
29% 44% 11% 10%
No 
Cow-calf Feedlot Cow-calf Feedlot
33% 28% 27% 18%
1Frequencies calculated using weights that adjust sample characteristics to  
match NASS cow-calf and feedlot operation numbers. Frequencies rounded to  
the nearest whole number.
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GASOLINE PRICES are the lowest they’ve been in a decade, and 
according to recent data from the 
Department of Energy, Americans are 
buying more gas than ever. While low 
gas prices are good for consumers, 
they may be troublesome to those who 
worry about greenhouse gas emissions. 
Meanwhile, two important federal 
policies are pushing ahead to decrease 
transportation sector emissions by 
increasing vehicle efϐiciency and the 
use of renewable fuels: the federal 
Corporate Average Fuel Economy 
standards and the US Renewable Fuel 
Standard (RFS). Both policies have 
substantial impacts on consumers’ 
vehicle and fuel choices as well as on 
their fuel spending. 
The Renewable Fuel Standard 
and RIN Markets
The RFS was passed in 2007 and 
established aggressive biofuel 
mandates—25 percent by 2022. The 
policy is a market-based regulation. 
Rather than requiring reϐineries to 
get into the biofuel business, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
created an accounting system where 
every gallon of biofuel produced in or 
imported into the United States generates 
a credit, known as a RIN. To comply 
with the RFS, reϐiners must turn in their 
required amount of RINs to the EPA at 
the end of each year. How they obtain 
those RINs is up to them. Petroleum 
reϐiners can buy RINS from independent 
biofuel producers, or get into the biofuel 
business and produce RINs themselves. 
Importantly, the price of RINs is set by 
market forces. The RFS determines the 
demand for RINs by specifying how 
much biofuel, and therefore how many 
Fuel Price Impacts of the Renewable Fuel Standard
Gabriel Lade and James Bushnell 
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RINs, need to be sold in aggregate each 
year. Biofuel producers determine the 
supply. As demand for RINs or the cost 
of producing biofuel increases, the price 
of RINs will increase and vice versa. 
Several individuals in the popular 
press, as well as reϐiners and large 
investors in oil companies, have called 
the viability of the RIN market into 
question recently. Criticisms come 
primarily in two forms: (a) the market 
lacks transparency and is subject to 
manipulation by speculators; and (b) 
reϐiners are getting unduly squeezed 
by RIN costs. Except for known fake 
RIN generation in the biodiesel market 
several years ago, there is little concrete 
evidence to support the ϐirst claim. 
Many markets operate outside of 
formal exchanges, and recent work by 
Lade, Lin-Lawell, and Smith (2016) 
ϐinds that RIN markets are efϐicient. 
The second claim ignores the economic 
principle of cost pass-through—when 
reϐiners’ costs go up, either because 
of increased oil prices or higher 
taxes, they pass a portion or all of the 
increased costs to downstream users. 
Impacts of the RFS on Consumers 
and Fuel Prices 
The RFS doesn’t just affect 
refineries and biofuel producers. 
The policy needs consumers to 
purchase more biofuels to succeed. 
For most consumers, this has meant 
switching from using pure gasoline 
to using E10—gasoline containing 
10 percent ethanol. In fact, nearly 
all gasoline sold in the United States 
today contains 10 percent ethanol 
(EIA 2016). Still, in 2007 Congress 
envisioned an even greater amount 
of biofuel use. This means that 
consumers must start using higher 
blends of ethanol such as E15 and E85 
to reach the targets set in 2007. 
RINs directly impact the relative 
cost of ethanol and gasoline. They 
subsidize biofuels and increase the 
cost of selling gasoline and diesel. 
These effects are reϐlected in the price 
that regional fuel terminals pay for 
fuel, and therefore affect prices paid 
by consumers at the pump. How large 
these price effects are depends on the 
pass-through of RINs and the ethanol-
gasoline blend of fuels. 
Fuel market supply and demand 
conditions determine pass-through. 
Because fuel demand is inelastic 
(people’s driving habits do not change 
much in response to gas prices), we 
expect taxes and subsidies on upstream 
producers to be passed through to retail 
prices. This means that as RIN prices 

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increase, gasoline will become more 
expensive and ethanol will become 
cheaper. What some critics of the RFS 
essentially argue is that this is not 
happening due to some market failure. 
To examine this issue, we study RIN 
pass-through in a market where we most 
expect to detect it: the market for E85. 
E85 contains between 51 and 83 percent 
ethanol, and therefore the value of the 
RIN subsidy for ethanol is high relative 
to the RIN tax on gasoline. Thus, when 
RIN prices rise, we expect E85 to become 
cheaper. Examining prices from over 
450 stations in the Midwest, we ϐind that 
the net subsidy for E85 is mostly passed 
through to retail prices. 
Figure 1 illustrates this point for our 
stations in Iowa. In Figure 1(a), we graph 
the average retail E85 price along with 
our estimates of the wholesale ethanol 
and gasoline cost components of E85 from 
2013–2016. After accounting for state 
and federal retail fuel taxes, we ϐind that 
wholesale E85 fuel costs largely exceeded 
retail prices over the period. Only when 
we allow for pass-through of RINs by 
adjusting the wholesale fuel costs can we 
rationalize historical retail E85 prices. 
When we adjust the wholesale costs by 
the RIN subsidy and tax in Figure 1(b), 
our estimated average retail margins are 
$0.29/gal, in line with estimates of retail 
margins for other fuels. 
Overall, our ϐindings mean that as RIN 
prices rise, reϐiners and biofuel producers 
pass along their additional costs and 
savings onto consumers, respectively. 
What does this mean for US consumers 
in coming years?  This depends on how 
aggressively the EPA pushes the biofuel 
mandates. The agency has slowed the 
pace of the mandates since 2013 from 
the original schedule passed by Congress. 
However, if the EPA continues to push the 
mandates beyond 10 percent, consumers 
will likely see prices of higher blend 
ethanol fuels like E15 and E85 fall. 
The United States government wants 
you to use more ethanol, but it certainly 
doesn’t expect you to do so out of the 
kindness of your heart—that is the beauty 
of market-based mechanisms. Prices will 
adjust, a potential boon for consumers 
ϐilling up with greater than E10 blends. Just 
make sure you have the right vehicle—not 
all vehicles are capable of using more than 
10 percent ethanol. 
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IN 2015, Iowa corn producers marketed approximately 2.5 billion 
bushels of corn and 554 million bushels 
of soybeans (USDA 2016). As part of 
their marketing strategy, some crop 
producers make use of pre-harvest 
pricing tools such as forward contracting 
and hedging with futures contracts. 
These are tools intended to either 
enhance the price producers can receive 
for their product or mitigate some 
risks associated with uncertain prices. 
Forward contracting allows a producer 
to fully or partially price his crop for 
delivery to a processor or elevator at a 
later date. Hedging on futures is similar 
to forward contracting in that the 
producer is pre-pricing his crop by taking 
a short position in a commodity contract 
with a delivery date in the future. Unlike 
forward contracting, hedges can be 
removed if price conditions change, 
but even with the hedge in place, basis 
remains an important risk component 
faced by the producer. In both cases, 
uncertainty about the size of his crop 
limits a producer from fully pre-pricing 
his harvest. 
Agricultural economists and 
extension specialists who work 
with producers and analyze 
marketing practices are interested in 
understanding the factors that play a 
role in producers’ forward contracting 
or hedging behaviors. How prevalent is 
the use of forward contracting among 
producers? Is pre-pricing driven by 
price or price changes? Which prices 
seem to matter most? 
Forward Contracting by Iowa Corn Producers: Connecting 
Hedging with Price Movements
by Keri L. Jacobs, Ziran B. Li, and Dermot J. Hayes 
 kljacobs@iastate.edu; ziranl@iastate.edu; dhayes@iastate.edu 
A study at ISU in collaboration 
with a prominent grain marketing 
cooperative in Iowa investigates the 
relationship between producers’ 
forward contracting behaviors and 
the December futures contract price 
movements of corn in the pre-harvest 
period of January through August.1 A 
database of over 115,000 individual 
priced-forward contracts for corn 
made from January through August for 
the years 2009–2013 were analyzed, 
focusing speciϐically on contracts 
for delivery between September 1 
of that year and August 31 of the 
following year. The study data included 
information on the number of bushels 
contracted each day and also the 
cooperative’s total purchases of corn in 
each year. The co-op’s weekly aggregate 
hedge ratio was constructed and 
analyzed for its response to changes in 
the December futures contract price as 
well as other candidate reference prices 
that could trigger producers’ hedging.2
Table 1 summarizes the aggregate 
observed forward contracting activity of 
producers in each of the marketing years 
by month. The data show that producers 
do indeed hedge more of their crop in 
some years and in other years only a 
small fraction of the expected harvest, 
and this is consistent with anecdotal 
evidence from grain merchandisers. 
Generally speaking, 2011 an d 2012 were 
relatively high-price years, with average 
December futures contract prices in the 
pre-harvest period at $6.42 and $6.09, 
respectively. In those years, and in 2010, 
a year of rapidly raising corn prices, 
over 20 percent of the crop was forward 
contracted by August with some form of 
price protection (basis or futures price). 
In contrast, less than 4 percent of the 
crop was priced by August of 2013, a 
year when corn prices fell signiϐicantly 
but still averaged over $5.38 per bushel; 
however, approximately 13 percent was 
forward contracted in 2009 when the 
average December price was just $4.02 
per bushel.
Regardless of the harvest price 
level observed by producers, they 
increased forward contracting for 
Table 1. Aggregate Producer Hedge Ratio of Expected Crop 
by Marketing Month and Year
 
Crop Growing Year 
  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
January 0.5% 1.5% 2.8% 0.7% 0.3% 
February 0.9% 2.0% 4.8% 1.8% 0.5% 
March 1.7% 2.7% 6.5% 3.4% 1.4% 
April 2.5% 5.0% 9.9% 4.2% 1.8% 
May 8.9% 6.6% 12.0% 5.0% 3.0% 
June 11.6% 7.2% 13.7% 13.0% 3.3% 
July 12.0% 14.7% 16.9% 20.3% 3.5% 
August 12.9% 24.1% 21.3% 23.3% 3.8% 
1Basis movements for delivery in October, November, and December for contracts initiated in the period January through Au-
gust are not considered.
2The producers’ hedge ratios are calculated by dividing the total amount of corn forward contracted (in bushels) by producers 
at any given time by the cooperative’s total annual handle of corn in that year.

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future delivery as prices rallied and 
reduced it when prices fell. Under a 
standard expected utility framework, 
producers using forward or futures 
contracts to reduce commodity price 
risk should behave opposite this to 
limit the downside risk.
Finally, there are asymmetries in 
these producers’ forward contracting 
that can be explained by price 
movements relative to reference prices. 
Producers forward contract a greater 
proportion of their crop when prices 
are above some historic reference 
price and they signiϐicantly limit selling 
when the price is below this reference.  
Controlling for time to harvest, expected 
production, and price volatility, a one 
percentage point increase in the 30-day 
average price of the December futures 
contract is associated with a 0.14 
percentage point increase in forward 
contracting; however, a one percentage 
point decrease in the same price causes 
a 0.12 percentage point reduction in 
forward contracting. The hedge and 
price series are plotted in Figure 1.
Does The Producers’ Strategy 
Result in a Higher Price of 
Marketed Grain?
That producers’ forward contracting 
activities appear to respond to price 
changes suggests that marketing may be 
less about risk management and more 
about an attempt to time the market 
to achieve a certain price target or 
minimum threshold. Using the known 
December contract prices and the actual 
contract data for each year, weighted 
average prices per bushel were 
calculated under several marketing 
scenarios. Table 2 summarizes the 
weighted average per bushel prices for 
these scenarios. In hindsight, no one 
strategy was best across all years. Also, 
the actual forward contracting behavior 
observed was not the worst case in any 
Table 2. Average Marketing Prices by Forward Contracting Strategy
 
Average Marketing Price Outcomes 
Marketing 
Strategy 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
5-year 
Avg 
Sell equal 
amounts monthly  $4.02   $3.95   $6.42   $6.09   $5.38   $5.17  
Price at harvest  $3.71   $5.46   $6.32   $7.50   $4.39   $5.48  
Price in January  $4.35   $4.13   $5.69   $5.67   $5.85   $5.14  
Price in March  $4.11   $3.97   $5.98   $5.59   $5.58   $5.05  
Actual 
contracting by 
producers 
 $4.15   $4.00   $6.57   $6.80   $5.49   $5.40  
year, and on average, the contracting 
resulted in an average price only slightly 
below the strategy that resulted in the 
highest ϐive-year average price: pricing 
it all at harvest.
The bottom line is that it 
appears producers are using forward 
contracting to time the market, and 
this strategy potentially increases 
the marketing risk they face. In years 
of good growing conditions and 
potentially large crops, they hedge a 
very low proportion of their crop. Yet, 
these are precisely the years when 
forward contracting a growing crop 
makes most economic sense. 
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IN EARLY 2013, farmers in Iowa and across the Midwest braced for 
a difϐicult corn market, with prices 
declining from $7/bushel in late 2012 
to $4/bushel in early 2015, and ϐinally 
settling at $3/bushel. Shielded from 
the world market, corn producers in 
China enjoyed a steady elevated corn 
price of almost $10/bushel from 2011 
until 2015—largely a result of China’s 
obscure price ϐloor corn policy. While 
China’s corn production is mainly 
used for domestic consumption, policy 
changes in China’s corn markets have 
trade implications for the global corn, 
beef, and pork sectors. For example, 
last month, the United States ϐiled 
a complaint with the World Trade 
Organization over China’s excessive 
subsidies to corn, rice, and wheat 
farmers (OUSTR 2016). In this article, 
we examine why China has ended its 
nine-year-old corn price support policy, 
and implemented new corn policies.
China’s Costly Corn Support Price 
Program 2007–2016
Corn, wheat, rice, and soybeans are 
major crops in China, and Chinese 
farmers have been paying agricultural 
taxes to grow these crops for almost 
two thousand years. In 2004, China 
switched from taxing corn farmers 
to providing subsidies for seed and 
machine purchases. To further boost 
rural income and ensure national food 
security, China started a nationwide 
corn stockpiling program in 2007. A 
key feature of this policy is that the 
government collects corn from farmers 
at minimum support prices, which 
are typically substantially higher than 
market prices. This signiϐicantly distorts 
the market—artiϐicially elevated 
support prices have enticed farmers to 
Of Maize and Markets: China’s New Corn Policy
by Qianrong Wu and Wendong Zhang
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grow corn and sell to the state storage 
facilities, while rising labor cost due to 
the increased rural income from this 
support policy have kept corn prices 
high. Figure 1 shows historical corn 
future prices in China and the United 
States—clearly revealing that from 
2007 to 2016 China’s policy drove corn 
prices up to two or three times that of 
US corn prices. Interestingly, it seems 
that China’s support price program has 
gone through two phases: (a) from 2007 
to 2010, the target support price for 
corn tracked closely to the corn import 
price plus a 65 percent out-of-quota 
duty; and (b) in 2011, China unveiled a 
ϐixed and extremely costly support price 
policy that kept futures prices between 
$9–$10/bushel for almost ϐive years.
High corn prices created incentive 
for Chinese farmers to produce 
more corn (see Figure 2). Farmers 
planted corn in grasslands, deserts, 
on mountainsides, and in marshes 
under the high corn price, increasing 
total acres to 95 million—a 26 
percent increase from 2006 to 2015 
(Li 2016). In 2012, corn exceeded 
rice in production to become China’s 
largest grain crop (SCD 2015). The 
corn support policy also led to a drop 
in domestic corn consumption as 
well as a substantial increase in the 
import of corn substitutes. This is due 
to the high domestic corn price and 
a spatial mismatch between where 
corn is grown and where it is used. As 
Figure 3 shows, major corn production 
occurs in northern China, while the 
corn demand, proxied by leading pork 
production regions, is mainly located 
in the south. Corn in China is mainly 
used for feed, and transportation costs 
from the production to consumption 
areas makes imported feed a cheaper 
alternative (Iowa Farm Bureau 2014). 
Corn end-users in China (e.g., feed 
processing plants, livestock producers, 
bio-reϐineries) need to tradeoff 
between domestic corn and imported 
corn. On the one hand, corn produced 
in northeastern China has a steep 
Figure 1. China and US corn future prices 2005–2016
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“rats in warehouses” (Hornby 2015). 
Some industry analysts estimate that over 
20 MMT of corn reserves are so moldy 
or deteriorated that they are no longer 
suitable for human consumption or feed 
use (Gale, Jewison, and Hansen 2014). 
Due to the huge ϐinancial and storage 
burden, this stockpiling program was 

support price plus a roughly 15 percent 
transportation cost; on the other hand, 
imported corn has a 65 percent out-
of-quota duty for imports beyond the 
quota, plus barging costs and a $20/
ton ocean transport fee. The gray line 
in Figure 1 presents the 65 percent out-
of-quota duty upon imported US No. 
2 corn prices, revealing that Chinese 
corn was still too expensive from 2013 
to 2015. As a result, massive amounts 
of corn and corn substitutes (sorghum, 
barley, DDGS, cassava chips, and cassava 
starch) were imported by China. In 
particular, Figure 4 reveals China’s 
imports of corn, sorghum, and barley 
have more than quadrupled from 2011 
to 2015 compared to low steady levels 
from 2005 to 2006. This is likely driven 
by the dramatic policy shift to a steep 
support price of $9–$10/bushel in 2011 
(as shown in Figure 1). 
As Figure 5 shows, China’s 
escalating corn storage is a noticeable 
outcome of the price support policy—
China and the United States had roughly 
the same ending stocks in 2006/07, but 
in 2015/16, China’s were almost double 
the US supply. Increased storage was the 
intention of the Chinese government, 
but is more a result of excessive 
production, import demand triggered 
by the support price policy, and a lack of 
domestic demand. In fact, warehouses 
in northeastern China currently have no 
room to store grain. More interestingly, 
corn storage accumulated faster after 
China unveiled the $9–$10/bushel ϐixed 
support prices in early 2011. By the 
end of 2015, China had stored enough 
corn for at least six months of domestic 
consumption. In contrast, the global 
average storage-to-consumption ratio is 
roughly 20 percent.
The stockpiling and support price 
policy has a steep price tag for China—the 
government faces signiϐicant ϐinancial 
burden due to high procurement prices. 
USDA estimated this policy has cost China 
more than $10 billion (Ballard 2016). The 
price support policy also took a toll on 
China’s aging storage facilities. In addition 
to corn degradation caused by structural 
deϐiciencies of warehouses, problems like 
mismanagement were commonplace; 
in fact, Chinese state television reported 
ofϐicials proϐited from selling inferior 
grains at new grain prices, dubbing them 
Figure 2. Corn production and consumption in China and the US 2000–2016 
Figure 3. Major corn and pork production provinces in China
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discontinued by the Chinese government 
in March 2016. 
China’s New Corn Subsidy Program
To replace the state stockpiling program 
and support price policy, China adopted 
a direct payment corn subsidy policy 
tied to planting acres in spring 2016—a 
policy familiar to US farmers. China’s 
Ministry of Finance will allocate a 
30-billion-yuan corn subsidy ($4.51 
billion) to farmers in four provinces 
in northeastern China, which boasts 
more than 60 percent of China’s corn 
production (Patton and Hogue 2016), in 
the 2016/17 crop year. The payment in 
each county will vary depending on the 
ratio of funds to area planted in corn, 
ranging from US $109–$163 per acre 
with an average of 150 yuan per mu 
($137 per acre) (Dim Sums 2016b,c).
China is now also employing 
multiple measures to cut corn 
production and storage. First, the 
Chinese government just permitted 
state-owned companies to export 
about 2 million metric tons of corn 
to neighboring countries including 
Central Asia (Dim Sums 2016a). 
Second, China’s Ministry of Agriculture 
is forecasting a 5-million-acre 
reduction in corn in 2016 due to 
the dramatically lower corn price, 
especially in fringe production areas 
out of the four northeast provinces 
(MAPRC 2015). Corn acreage is 
projected to drop from 93 million acres 
to around 86 million acres in 2018–
2020 (Dim Sums 2015), and converted 
corn acreage is projected to soybean, 
other coarse grains, and fodder crops. 
Third, companies and interest groups 
have been lobbying the Chinese 
government to subsidize the use of 
stored corn for biofuel production.
Implications for US Agriculture
China is the largest and third-largest 
importer of US soybean and pork, 
respectively; therefore, it is critically 
important to assess China’s corn policy 
and its impacts on US agriculture. 
In the short run, it seems China will 
embrace a direct payment corn subsidy 
program, similar to what the United 
States adopted about two decades ago. 
As a measure to decrease stored corn, 
China is offering corn exports at lower 
prices than the United States and Brazil, 
which could potentially put a downward 
pressure on the global corn market. 
However, the poor quality of stored corn 
might hinder China’s role in the global 
corn export market. In the meantime, 
China’s imports of corn substitutes 
might decrease in order to encourage 
domestic consumption. 
In the medium and long run, 
China is downplaying the strategic 
role of corn, and only regarding wheat 
and rice as its two main food crops, 
which may suggest the possibility 
Figure 4. China corn, sorghum, barley, and oat imports 2005–2016
Figure 5. China and US corn ending stocks 2000–2016
continued on page 14
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THE CROP and livestock markets have experienced signiϐicant swings 
over the past few years—record crop 
prices in 2012 and 2013 were followed 
by record livestock prices in 2014. Since 
then, prices have tumbled across the 
board. In most cases, price reductions 
have been driven by increases in supply, 
as opposed to drops in demand. 
For the hog sector, the last ϐive years 
have been very good from a packer 
demand perspective. As Figure 1 shows, 
packer demand for hogs surged in 2012 
and has basically ridden that wave ever 
since, with only a slight setback in 2015. 
The downturn in 2015 occurred when 
hog prices dropped from record levels. 
Pork exports have  been strong since 
2011, supporting packer demand; and the 
near-term future looks positive as well, 
as the pork industry will add slaughter 
capacity over the next couple of years. The 
growth in packer demand for 2016 is a 
combination of larger pork supplies and 
higher real prices than a year ago.
Domestic demand for pork, 
measured at the retail grocery counter, 
has also strengthened over the past 
ϐive years, despite the volatility in the 
For Ag, It’s Mostly Good News on the Demand Front
By Lee Schulz and Chad Hart 
lschulz@iastate.edu; chart@iastate.edu
hog market. Figure 2 displays the retail 
demand for pork. Domestic pork demand 
has not been this strong since 2004; 
however, the growth in pork demand has 
slowed over the last couple of years.
For the cattle sector, the packer 
demand over the past few years has 
been more variable, as can be seen in 
Figure 3. In general, packer demand has 
trended downward since 2011; however, 
there has been a couple of waves of 
demand growth, in 2013 and 2015. 
Packer demand in 2016 took the largest 
step back since 2009. While the amount 
of beef moving through packers has 
increased, the price decline more than 
offset the gain. Cattle prices during the 
2nd quarter of 2016 were down nearly 14 
percent from the previous quarter.
While packer demand for cattle has 
declined, retail demand for beef has 
trended higher, peaking as recently as 
2015. Figure 4 shows retail demand for 
beef. While beef demand has slowed 
a bit, the 2nd quarter numbers show 
demand holding at the second-highest 
level since 2000. Compared to a year 
ago, beef consumption is higher and 
retail prices are lower; however, the 
decline in prices is bigger than the 
increase in consumption.
The mostly positive demand story 
for the livestock industries has also 
contributed to a stronger demand and 
usage story for the crop sector as well. 
Figure 5 shows the quarterly usage of 
US corn over the past ϐive marketing 
years. The marketing year for both corn 
and soybeans begins on September 1 of 
the year when the crop was harvested. 
So, for example in the corn and soybean 
ϐigures, “2011 Q1” refers to the 1st 
quarter of the 2011 marketing year, or 
September to November 2011. The 2nd 
quarter covers December to February, 
the 3rd quarter March to May, and the 
4th quarter June to August. As Figures 5 
and 6 show, livestock feed usage peaks 
during the 1st quarter of the marketing 
year. While that 1st quarter peak has not 
been quite as high over the past couple 
of years, the usage in the other quarters 
has provided support. On average over 
the ϐive-year period, feed usage has 
increased by 11 million bushels per year.
The ethanol industry’s usage of 
corn has grown signiϐicantly over the 
past couple of decades, such that it now 
Figure 2. Second quarter (Apr-Jun) US retail 
pork demand
Figure 1. Second quarter (Apr-Jun) US packer 
demand for hogs index
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Figure 6. Quarterly usage of US soybeans 2011-2015
Figure 4. Second quarter (Apr-Jun) US retail all 
fresh beef demand
Figure 3. Second quarter (Apr-Jun) US packer 
demand for cattle index
Figure 5. Quarterly usage of US corn 2011-2015
challenges feed as the largest usage 
category. While corn usage for ethanol 
declined in the 2012 marketing year, the 
general pattern has been slow and steady 
growth. From 2011 to 2015, corn usage 
for ethanol grew by 24 million bushels 
per year; however, the strongest annual 
growth rate for corn usage over the 
past ϐive years has been in exports. The 
international market for corn has been 
absorbing, on average, an additional 39 
million bushels per year. Much of the 
export gain has come from the Latin 
and South American countries, as the 
provisions of free trade agreements are 
enacted. Corn usage in other categories 
(corn sweeteners, industrial uses, etc.) 
has remained ϐlat over the same period.
There has been similar growth 
in the components of soybean usage. 
Figure 6 outlines the usage of soybeans 
over the past ϐive marketing years. 
Roughly half of the US soybean crop 
goes to international markets and the 
other half is used domestically. Like 
corn, soybean usage is loaded toward 
the front end of the marketing year. For 
domestic use, this is due to the need to 
crush soybeans to create soybean meal, 
a livestock feed product. Soybean oil 
is also created, which is often used for 
biodiesel production or other industrial 
processes. Both of these products can 
also be exported. The average growth 
rate for domestic soybean usage has 
been a 7 million bushel increase per 
year over the past ϐive years.
Most of the growth for soybean 
demand over the past few years has 
come from exports. The Chinese 
market continues to expand its need 
for soybeans and that has driven US 
soybean exports to a steady stream of 
records. The projections for the 2016 
marketing year continue that string. On 
average, soybean exports have grown by 
20 million bushels per year. Given USDA’s 
latest projections, this year soybean 
exports will rise by 45 million bushels.
Overall, the demand picture for 
crops and livestock is good. The issues 
the markets are having are more 
related to large supplies than declines 
in demand. For the livestock sector, the 
growth in supplies is slowing; however, 
the crop sector has not been able to pull 
back on production. In both sectors, 
prices will remain under pressure given 
the larger supplies. 
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Succession Planning, Perceived Obstacles, and 
Attractions for Future Generations Entering Beef 
Cattle Production
continued from page 2
obstacle than do cow-calf producers. 
This is not surprising given the amount 
of hired labor differences between 
these two sectors. In 2015, a survey 
conducted by the Iowa Cattleman’s 
Association highlighted that only 49 
percent of cow-calf operations had 
non-family employees compared to 87 
percent of feedlot operations. Moreover, 
only 24 percent of cow-calf operations 
had multiple non-family employees, 
as opposed to 52 percent of feedlot 
operations (ICA 2015a,b). 
No statistical differences in any of 
the obstacle/attraction factors were 
noted between cow-calf producers that 
do and do not have a succession plan 
(Figure 1). However, feedlot operators 
with a succession plan have higher 
average ratings for most lifestyle factors 
(i.e., work hours, rural lifestyle, and 
self-employment) than do operators 
without a succession plan. Conversely, 
those without a plan are somewhat more 
negative about cost share programs (e.g., 
EQIP) than are those with a succession 
plan. Those with a succession plan may 
have been more likely to utilize state 
or federal programs to offset feedlot 
facility design and construction because 
they had an apparent successor, thereby 
enabling them to be more progressive 
and use longer horizons in assessing 
investment opportunities. 
Feedlot operators without a plan 
are also more pessimistic about capital 
availability and costs as well as labor 
availability and costs than thos e that 
have a succession plan. These results are 
similar to the 2004 Iowa Farm and Rural 
Life Poll where, regardless of farm type, 
57 percent of survey respondents would 
not encourage young people to enter 
farming, citing capital cost and labor as 
two of the top ϐive reasons (Lasley 2005). 
The future size and structure of 
the US beef cattle industry will be 
determined by the individual decisions 
of over 740,000 cattle owners (USDA 
NASS 2014) and their potential 
successors. With current demographics, 
including producer age and an equity 
distribution skewed to older producers, 
a large share of productive assets in the 
beef cattle industry will likely change 
hands over the next decade.
Public policy will inϐluence 
how and to whom these assets will 
be transferred, which, in turn, will 
Note: One cow-calf respondent was not included in this analysis because they responded “Other” 
without further explanation to the question, “Is there a succession plan for transferring your cattle 
operation upon exiting the industry?”
1A ϐive-point Likert scale was used for the degree to which lifestyle, policy, and cost and availability 
factors were perceived as an obstacle or attraction for future generations entering cattle production, 
with 1 = Major Obstacle, 2 = Obstacle, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Attraction, 5 = Major Attraction.
2Means calculated using weights that adjust sample characteristics to match NASS cow-calf and feedlot 
operation numbers.
3Asterisks denote statistical signiϐicance of a difference-in-means test between the relevant groups: 
* signiϐicant at 10%; ** signiϐicant at 5%; *** signiϐicant at 1%. 
Figure 1. Comparison of producers with and without a succession plan1,2,3

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help shape beef cattle production 
for generations to come. This 
makes it crucial to explore and 
evaluate alternative policies so that 
policymakers, stakeholder groups, and 
educators can assess possible pathways 
of successful farm transition. As part of 
the foundation for this exploration, it 
is important to understand perceived 
obstacles and attractions for future 
generations and identify alternative 
strategies for addressing and 
embracing them. Given this improved 
understanding, targeted educational 
efforts and innovative approaches to 
succession plans could be developed. 
Future policy and educational 
efforts should not only be designed to 
encourage and assist beginning farmers 
entering beef cattle production but also 
designed to address long-run challenges 
and enhance their chances of surviving, 
prospering, and growing as viable farm 
operators. Surely, this is, in part, what 
existing cattle producers are referencing 
as obstacles for future generations 
entering cattle production. 
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of a transition from a target of 
self-sufϐiciency towards greater 
involvement in the global marketplace. 
As the Chinese people demand more 
pork and beef with rising per capita 
income, China will likely need more 
corn and corn substitutes in the future. 
This need will be ampliϐied with 
limited arable land, degrading soil 
quality, and an exodus of rural youth 
to cities. USDA projects that China will 
need to import signiϐicant amounts 
of corn—up to 22 MMT—by 2023/24 
(Hansen and Gale 2014). The United 
States, along with Ukraine and Brazil, 
would likely be a major player if that 
were to happen. 
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